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I. The Mutual Supportiveness Debate: “Big Chill” or “Quantum 
Leap”?
When the World Trade Organization was launched in 1995, the Committee 
on Trade and Environment (CTE) was established to identify the relationship 
between trade measures and environmental measures in order to promote 
sustainable development.(1) The 1996 Singapore ministerial declaration 
confirmed continuing examination of “the scope of complementarities between 
trade liberalization, economic development and environmental protection.” 
At the Doha ministerial conference of 2001, it was agreed to start multilateral 
negotiations, for the first time, on some of the identified issues on trade and 
environment.(2) It aims to make interna-tional trade and environmental policies 
“mutually supportive.” For many in the environmental community, it should 
have been a long-awaited starting point for sustainable development governance. 
By the time of the Cancun ministerial conference of 2003, however, initial hopes 
had been dashed.(3) The environmental issue was, in substance, marginalized in 
the July 2004 package, which included frameworks for establishing modalities 
in agriculture and other market access issues. The package had just one sentence 
on the environment, that the General Council “takes note” of the report by 
the Special Sessions of the Committee on Trade and Environment (CTESS). 
From the environmentalist perspective, that was very bleak treatment.(4) Many 
observers came to recognize that the WTO’s neoliberalism has had “big chill” 
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effects on implementation and negotiation of the multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs).(5) From another perspective, however, the discussion 
of ways to avoid future conflicts between the WTO and MEAs looked like 
a “quantum leap” from the CTESS mandate.(6) How can we account for this 
difference? What is happening, or is not happening, to the Doha negotiations on 
the WTO–MEA relationship?
My paper addresses and answers the following questions: How did 
international trade and environmental regimes emerge and evolve, and with what 
norms? What kinds of WTO–MEA relationship can theoretically be postulated? 
Despite both the WTO and MEAs sharing the goal of sustainable development, 
why has this issue faced political impasses without a major breakthrough? How 
can the “mutual supportiveness” of the WTO and MEAs be attained, if at all? 
What are the prospects for the Hong Kong ministerial meeting to be held in 
December 2005 and beyond?
I offer an argument that the parochial conception of trade and environment 
not only hardens current negotiating positions, but also leads to a wide variety 
of unfortunate consequences for the WTO–MEA relationship. Instead, “mutual 
supportiveness” needs to be understood in a more dynamic way. In so doing, the 
biological concept of co-evolution and the ecological concept of symbiosis help 
a deeper understanding, if these are combined with the changing structures of 
norms, power, and interest priorities of the WTO members in global governance. 
The data used in this paper cover the CTESS from its first meeting in March 
2002 to its eleventh meeting in February 2005.
II. Co-evolution of International Trade and Environmental Regimes
International trade and environmental regimes have evolved in separate 
historical contexts, and yet it seems that they show similar patterns of evolution 
with the four types of governance stages that I call national, international, world, 
and global. Each stage adds to, rather than replaces, the previous stages. The 
trade and environmental regimes have encountered each other at the crossroad of 
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their respective fourth stages, where an interface for both potential conflict and 
cooperation can be found.
Evolution of Trade Regimes
International trade regimes have evolved from mercantilism to liberalism, 
then to “embedded liberalism,” and then to global trade with non-trade concerns, 
over more than three hundred years. The first stage is mercantilism, which was 
dominant during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is the idea that 
unilateral interventions by the state can increase the nation’s wealth. The twin 
forms of mercantilism are exemplified by protectionism in the import side, 
and industrial policy in the export side. These approaches can still be found in 
today’s “new protectionism” and “strategic trade policy.” Thus, claims about 
protecting the environment appear to be disguised “green protectionism” in the 
eyes of developing countries. For developed countries with a competitive edge 
in environmental technology, liberalization of environmental goods and services 
can be accompanied by their industrial promotion.
The dominant idea at the second stage is liberalism. Liberal international 
trade under Pax Britannica was spread in the nineteenth century with the most-
favored nation principle within a larger but selected number of countries. 
However, liberal trade did not always mean impartial exchange. Imperialism 
with unequal treaties resulted in the world resolving into mercantilism and 
protectionist blocs when the world wars and depressions occurred.
The post-WWII world economic order with the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was normally regarded as a force for “free trade.” 
Yet actually it was the third trade regime stage that John G. Ruggie called 
“embedded liberalism,” that is the compromise of mercantilism and liberalism.(7) 
It was an attempt at “free and fair trade” in a multilateral world, although it 
was virtually a plurilateral club of industrialized countries. The concept of fair 
trade in the GATT context referred to reciprocity in tariff reduction, and later, 
in the Uruguay Round negotiations, fairness could refer to “market access.” At 
the same time, fairness also referred to the procedural aspect by strengthening 
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the dispute settlement mechanism. However, these conceptions of fairness are 
still distant from the same term used in civil society. It can refer to social and 
environmental justice in equitable trade as well as democratic participation in 
trade negotiations.
When the WTO was established, the world trade regime had already reached 
the fourth stage of global trade governance. This regime requires cooperation 
with non-trade concerns, non-state actors, and preventive actions. By this stage, 
the liberal trade idea was and is being applied to services and agriculture as 
well as industrial goods, while the matters of non-trade concerns, including 
protection of intellectual property rights, core labor standards, the environment, 
and investment, were negotiated or studied. In terms of process, global trade is 
at a crossroad transcending a multilateral state-to-state forum. Steve Charnovitz 
called this “WTO cosmopolitics,” in which non-state actors are more involved.(8)
Evolution of Environmental Regimes
As compared to the long history of international trade regimes over three 
hundred years, global environmental regimes have a short history, over only 
the last three decades. Despite this sharp contrast, the evolving patterns of 
environmental regimes appear quite similar to that of trade regimes: national, 
international, world, and global. Since the 1970s, the environmental regime has 
quickly followed a similar four-stage ladder.
In the first stage, environmental issues were conceived as a public nuisance 
at the national level. The dynamism of environmental destruction was well 
explained by Garrett Hardin as the “tragedy of the commons.”(9) Overpopulation 
of cattle in the village common was the cause of this archetypical tragedy. One 
solution is “enclosure,” or privatization of the commons, by which the cost 
of conservation is internalized via the institution of private property. Another 
strategy is nationalization, by which the commons are transformed into public 
or government assets. Many of today’s environmental policies fall somewhere 
between market-oriented mechanisms and government regulation.
The second environmental regime stage emerged in response to 
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internationalization of pollution, partly because of strengthened regulations at 
home. Environmental issues joined the international agenda in the 1972 United 
Nations Conference on Human Environment held in Stockholm. The main 
Swedish concern was acid rain, which was a transboundary environmental issue 
“exported” from industrial Europe. The so-called brown issues—pollution at 
the domestic level—required transboundary, or international, environmental 
governance. However, the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution was almost exclusively a North-oriented venture, because at that time 
acid rain pollutants were concentrated in developed countries and not yet in 
many developing countries.
It is the third stage where environmental issues in developing countries were 
recognized as world problems. A world-wide conception of natural resources 
is exemplified by the New International Economic Order and the concept of 
“the common heritage of humankind” in the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea. The United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) 
was headquartered in Nairobi, Kenya, where the special session of the UNEP 
Governing Council was held in 1982. The World Charter for Nature was also 
adopted in 1982 by the initiative of the leaders of the developing countries. 
However, these leaders also revealed that their main concerns were poverty 
eradication and economic development, rather than protection and conservation 
of natural resources. Financial and technological transfers as well as capacity 
development for developing countries are emphasized in many MEAs adopted 
or revised during the 1980s.
A mutually supportive relationship between development and environment 
was instituted with the concept of sustainable development. It was a 
globally recognized norm at the United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development held in Rio de Janeiro, attended both by government 
representatives and by many non-governmental organizations and civil society 
players. It was the starting point for the fourth stage of global environmental 
governance. Agenda 21 adopted in Rio says that “Environment and trade 
policies should be mutually supportive.”(10) In the post-Rio context, the preamble 
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of the WTO agreement recognizes sustainable development as an integral part 
of the multilateral trading system. By the 2002 World Summit for Sustainable 
Development (WSSD), the three pillars of the sustainable development concept 
were widely recognized: economic, environmental, and social. Thus, four main 
norms can be found in the current debate on the WTO–MEA relationship: 
economic liberalism, environmentalism, labor/social/human rights, and 
developmentalism.
An Ecological Model of the WTO–MEA Relationship
The historically evolved four norms stated above can be found in the 
current Doha Development Agenda negotiations. In order to analyze possible 
consequences of the “mutual supportiveness” debate, the present paper applies 
the ecological models suggested by Alfred James Lotka and Vito Volterra to 
the theoretical relationships of these norms in the WTO.(11) Since the Lotka–
Volterra model deals with two-part relationships, let us consider the relationship 
between the two main norms: liberalism (or the economic pillar of sustainable 
development) as exemplified by the WTO; and environmentalism (environmental 
protection or conservation, or the environmental pillar of sustainable 
development) as promoted by MEAs or the UNEP.
It is important to note that symbiosis in ecology does not always refer 
to harmonious cooperation. When two species of plants or animals interact 
with one another, several interactions can be identified (Table 1). The first is 
mutualism, where benefits can be received by the both interacting species (plus 
vs. plus). The mutually supportive relationship between the WTO and MEAs 
is expected to fall into this category, although ecology suggests that it may be 
better viewed as mutual exploitation rather than as cooperation. The second 
is commensalism, which is a relationship that directly helps one species but 
does not affect the other much (plus vs. null). The third category is divided 
into predation and parasitism. Predation occurs when a larger species preys 
or grazes on a smaller species (plus vs. minus). A similar relationship can be 
found in parasitism, although the preying parasite may not die as a result of 
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the interaction. Mutualism, commensalism, and parasitism are all cases of the 
ecological concept of symbiosis.
Predation and the following three categories are not symbiosis. The fourth 
is neutralism. In the neutral relationship, two species are linked only indirectly 
through the interaction with other species and have no direct effect on one 
another (null vs. null). The fifth is amensalism, which is detrimental to one 
species and neutral to the other (minus vs. null). The sixth is competition, in 
which two-way negative effects flow to both species, although the superior 
competitor may not be greatly affected (minus vs. minus).
Table 1: Ecological Model of the WTO–MEA Relationship
 WTO/MEAs + 0 –
 + mutualism commensalism predation/parasitism
 0 commensalism neutralism amensalism
 – parasitism/predation amensalism competition
In addition to the above relationships suggested by the Lotka–Volterra 
model, this paper will take into account the realist–liberal debate on relative vs. 
absolute gains.(12) Realists assume that individual agency acts in seeking relative 
gains, while liberals normally assume that cooperation is possible since the 
benefits of trade liberalization can be measured by absolute gains. As already 
seen in the above categories of predation/parasitism and competition, it is 
important to consider the relative size of the two species populations and their 
gains in relative terms. Thus, for example, it is possible that a norm embodied 
in one institution receives a larger gain, while the other idea embodied in 
another institution receives less (but positive) gains in the actuality of “mutual 
supportiveness” of the WTO–MEA relationship (larger plus vs. smaller plus).
Taken together, a complex variety of consequences of the WTO–MEA 
relationship is possible, especially when we also take account of the four main 
norms that can be found in the Doha Development Agenda negotiations. It 
is important to consider the WTO–MEA relationship in a wider context of 
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global governance, especially the developmentalist norm embodied in the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and labor/
social/human rights concerns promoted by other UN organizations, such as 
the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the World Health Organization 
(WHO). Theoretically, it is possible to attain the “mutually supportive” 
relationship at the sacrifice of developmentalism and/or labor/social/human 
rights concerns. The consequence of the WTO–MEA relationship will also 
be varied in accordance with the negotiation items. Therefore, the following 
sections will examine the state of play on the three negotiation items mandated 
by the Doha Declaration: WTO rules and specific trade obligations (STOs) in 
MEAs; information exchange and observer status; and environmental goods and 
services.
III. WTO Rules and Specific Trade Obligations in MEAs
The first negotiation item is related to legal and institutional issues. 
Paragraph 31 (i) of the Doha Declaration instructed WTO members to negotiate 
on “the relationship between existing WTO rules and specific trade obligations 
set out in multilateral environmental agreements. The negotiations shall be 
limited in scope to the applicability of such existing WTO rules as among parties 
to the MEA in question. The negotiations shall not prejudice the WTO rights of 
any Member that is not a party to the MEA in question.”
The assumption of this negotiation mandate stems from the criticism that 
international environmental regulations can function as trade barriers. In other 
words, it is hypothesized that MEA environmentalism is a predator against WTO 
liberalism. According to Konrad von Moltke, the major problem is that the MEA 
structure is not defined by economic impacts, although they can have economic 
impact.(13) This is what he calls “structural incommensurability” between 
international environmental and economic regimes.
As the “state of play” paper, submitted by CTESS Chair Toufiq Ali before 
the July 2004 package, mentions, two main logics of argumentation have 
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emerged to explain “structural incommensurability” under this part of the 
mandate.(14) One is a conceptual approach to the WTO–MEA relationship in 
a broader context of current and future global governance, as exemplified by 
the submission of the European Communities (EC).(15) It takes the view that 
environmentalism and STOs, set out in MEAs, are neutral to WTO rules. The 
other is a practical approach, identifying and discussing STOs on the basis of 
national experiences and a narrow mandate, as suggested by the United States 
(US) and others. It seems that it is a defensive attempt to limit the scope of the 
WTO–MEA interface as least in the status quo, so that environmentalism, which 
can potentially affect liberalism, does not compromise the liberal trade regime.
The EC paper on global governance started with the importance of MEAs, 
and argued that legal clarification in the WTO would benefit not only present but 
also future MEA negotiations. The EC also attempted to broaden the definitions 
of themes by arguing that not only global, but also regional, MEAs should be 
considered as potentially multilateral, and by suggesting a broader reading of 
STOs “set out in MEAs” in terms of desirability, which can include not only 
the text of MEAs but also obligations decided by Conferences of Parties or 
contained in annexes or protocols to MEAs.(16) The EC argued that the expression 
“existing WTO rules” should not be limited to GATT Article XX, because it was 
not sufficient to accommodate MEAs. As for the party/non-party issue, the EC as 
well as Canada pointed out that the practical distinction between party and non-
party was not always clear, as in the case of the Ban Amendment to the Basel 
Convention.(17)
The EC’s broader conceptualization emphasized the “deference” principle 
and the principle of “no hierarchy” between trade and environmental regimes. 
It was argued that both MEAs and the WTO should remain responsible and 
competent for issues falling within their respective primary areas of competence 
and expertise. According to international law, such principles as Lex Posterior (a 
later law precedes an earlier one) and Lex Specialis (a specialized treaty prevails 
over a general treaty) may be applied to a conflict between different norms. In 
reality, however, it is not always easy to distinguish between early and later 
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laws, and between general and specialized natures. In that case, the deference 
principle suggests legal parity. Thus, the deference principle is a legal expression 
of neutralism at best, rather than mutualism.
As a corollary of the deference principle, some non-EC members also 
argued for a broader concept of sustainable development governance. Canada 
mentioned the importance of sustainable development in the context of WSSD, 
and Brazil recalled the Singapore consensus for a broad scope for trade 
measures to be applied pursuant to MEAs.(18) Despite this broad consensus, the 
EC’s global governance approach has been heavily criticized by many countries, 
including the US, Australia, India, Brazil and many developing countries. For 
instance, Ecuador explicitly claimed that to bring the abstract concept of global 
governance to the WTO would complicate the negotiations, and that it fell 
outside the Paragraph 31 (i) mandate.(19)
The US approach started with the premise that the current WTO–MEA 
relationship was a good one.(20) On the surface, it looks similar to the deference 
principle stressed by the EC. However, the practical approach to narrowing 
the mandate stems from the fear of environmentalism’s predation against 
liberalism, and therefore calls for maintaining at least the currently “good” WTO
–MEA relationship in the sense that there had been no formal dispute directly 
involving MEAs and the WTO rules. That is perhaps the reason why the US 
emphasized that the mandate was limited to “existing” WTO rules, rather than 
calling for the elaboration of any new rules.(21) The US also argued that “STOs 
set out in MEAs” were legally binding trade obligations set forth in an MEA, 
not including a decision of the Conference of the Parties.(22) Similarly, according 
to the Argentinean paper, the mandate is not targeting MEAs in general, but 
limited only to those MEAs already “in force.” (23) The US also argued that there 
was no substitute for enhanced domestic coordination between MEA and WTO 
policymakers and negotiators.(24) This implies that domestic coordination is 
sufficient for maintaining the status quo WTO–MEA relationship.
Practically, the US argued that no definition of MEAs was needed, and 
identified six MEAs that included STOs.(25) Later, the US focused on three 
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MEAs: the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), 
the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), and the 
Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain 
Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (PIC), and identified 
a wide variety of STOs, including export restrictions.(26) In each case, however, 
the number of MEAs was smaller than the number of the MEAs with trade 
measures that were identified by the WTO secretariat or the number of MEAs 
organizations invited to the MEA Information Session at CTESS.(27) It should 
also be noted that many MEAs were not ratified by the US.
In a manner similar to the US and Australian positions but for the purposes 
of development, many developing countries started the discussion with the WTO 
rules, rather than MEAs. For instance, Kenya suggested a three-step negotiation 
process: first, the identification of the WTO rules relevant for the environment; 
second, listing the MEAs relevant to WTO rules; and third, negotiating the 
WTO–MEA relationship by taking developing country concerns into account.(28) 
As for the definition of STOs, Malaysia suggested a distinction between 
mandatory STOs and non-mandatory trade measures, and India questioned the 
appropriateness of the EC’s distinction between obligation de resultat (a result 
which had to be achieved) and obligation de comportement (the measures which 
had to be used to achieve) in the WTO context.(29) Venezuela also questioned 
if the EC’s emphasis on the Rio Principles would produce the common but 
differentiated responsibility in addressing environmental problems in the WTO, 
with reference to the concept of special and differential treatment.(30) Similarly, 
the need for technical assistance and capacity building was frequently addressed 
by a number of developing countries. These are some examples of developing 
countries’ worry that disguised environmentalism or a mutually supportive 
relationship between environmentalism and liberalism can be amensalism or 
predation for developmentalism. As Matsushita, Schoenbaum and Mavroidis 
point out, “the matter of environmental regulations and their effect on market 
access problems of developing countries, one of the tasks given to the CTE in 
1995, has not received enough attention.”(31)
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IV. Information Exchange and Observer Status
The second negotiation item is related to communication issues. Paragraph 
31 (ii) of the Doha Declaration mandates negotiations on “procedures for regular 
information exchange between the MEA Secretariat and the relevant WTO 
committees, and the criteria for granting observer status.”
This negotiation item is a possible rebuttal to the criticism that WTO 
liberalism was undermining the effectiveness of MEA regimes. Such a criticism 
assumes WTO liberalism’s predation at the expense of MEA environmentalism. 
It was evidenced by the reality that some MEAs allow the WTO to participate in 
meetings simply on request, in spite of the lack of reciprocity on the part of the 
WTO, with observer status.(32) Thus, institutionalization of the existing WTO–
MEA relationship may strengthen the asymmetry of the status quo.
Among divergent views expressed, two main lines of argument can be 
observed. One is that quick progress, or “early harvest,” in this negotiation 
agenda is called for, as is seeking information exchange and granting reciprocal 
observer status by institutionalization at the international level. When the GATT 
was elevated into the WTO, the idea of a World Environment Organization 
(WEO) as the counterpart to the WTO was also suggested by some people, 
including former WTO Director-General Renato Ruggiero. Now that the 
WEO idea looks unrealistic, it is important to, at the least, achieve or restore a 
reciprocal WTO–MEA relationship in this area. The other line of argument starts 
with neutralism in the status quo. It is argued that information exchange and 
coordination can be best achieved at the domestic level, and that the issue of the 
criteria granting observer status should be negotiated and decided in the Trade 
Negotiations Committee and the General Council, rather than CTESS.
The former view was advocated by such countries as Canada, Switzerland, 
and the EC. Canada and Switzerland called for environment-mainstreaming in 
the WTO, and suggested that information exchange should be formalized not 
only at the CTE but also other WTO bodies, such as the Council for Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, the Council for Trade in 
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Services, the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, the Committee on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, and the Committee on Agriculture.(33) The 
Committee on Trade and Development could also be included. It is difficult to 
limit the scope of not only the WTO bodies but also the MEAs to be covered. 
For example, Japan attempted to renew the ad hoc invitation to the International 
Tropical Timber Organization, but Malaysia objected.(34) It is also important 
to consider the WTO–MEA relationship in this area from a wider perspective. 
Some countries, like Norway and Brazil, called for enhanced cooperation 
between UNEP/UNCTAD/MEAs/WTO.(35) The EC called for close cooperation 
and increased information flows at national and international levels as an integral 
part of improved global governance that could translate into outcomes.(36) The EC 
also proposed the possibility of including regional environmental regimes and of 
involving NGOs in information sessions, but Kenya responded that it fell outside 
the mandate.(37)
Both the US and the EC called for early action in this area. However, it 
seems that the US and Australia looked for more coordination between trade 
and environmental officers at the national level. While some members, such 
as the US, New Zealand, and Japan, argued that progress in Paragraph 31 
(ii) would spill over to Paragraph 31 (i) negotiations, others did not have that 
understanding. Rather, Pakistan argued that progress on MEA observer status in 
CTESS would have to await progress on 31 (i).
On information exchange, many suggestions were made, including 
formalizing information sessions with MEAs on a regular basis, holding 
information sessions on specific themes by grouping meetings between WTO 
committees and MEAs, parallel events, collective events, and cooperative 
events for technical assistance and capacity building, document exchange, and 
electronic databases. Mexico and Malaysia drew members’ attention to the 
integrity of the rule on the de-restriction of documents newly adopted by the 
General Council. Cuba and Egypt argued that institutionalization of information 
exchange was not in conformity with the mandate parameters.(38) However, joint, 
collective, or cooperative activities between the WTO and MEAs for capacity 
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development and other concerns, rather than their own policy objectives, will 
constitute a helpful basis in searching for a Win-Win-Win-Win solution to the 
four norms and concerns.
As for observer status, the EC suggested that all core MEAs that had 
participated in previous ad hoc information sessions should be granted observer 
status, while the US mentioned the possibility of a narrower range of MEAs 
to be granted observer status, based on defined indicators. The US addressed 
two different WTO forums on the existing procedures: the Trade Negotiations 
Committee, with respect to negotiating bodies, and the General Council, with 
respect to non-negotiating bodies.(39) The understanding of the mandate by 
Egypt, Cuba, and some other countries was different from that of either the 
EC or the US proposal. For them, the criteria for granting observer status have 
to be negotiated.(40) Switzerland favored reciprocity between the WTO and the 
MEAs. However, the observer status issue is pending for not only environmental 
organizations but also other organizations, such as the General Council for the 
Arab States of the Gulf and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Thus, 
the issue has become politically sensitive, and it has become difficult to treat the 
MEA secretariats differently from other international organizations. It is widely 
supported that observer issues should be horizontal and that decisions be made 
by the Trade Negotiation Committee and the General Council, but there is also 
an emerging consensus that CTESS has a role to play.
V. Environmental Goods and Services
The third negotiation agenda is on environmental goods and services. 
Paragraph 31 (iii) of the Doha Declaration mentions “the reduction or, as 
appropriate, elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental goods 
and services.”
The assumption for this negotiation item is that enhanced WTO liberalism, 
which will spread and diffuse environmentally friendly products, services, and 
technologies, does contribute to environmental conservation.(41) In other words, 
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it is to verify the effectiveness of market-oriented environmentalism in the sense 
that the WTO liberalism can provide MEAs with mutualism. Procedurally, 
CTESS’s monitoring role in the Doha negotiations was stressed and generally 
agreed by members to do so. Another line of argument is the criticism of 
the above market-oriented environmentalism as disguised environmental 
mercantilism, seeking adjustment for relative gains, so that developing countries 
can also secure absolute gains. To avoid environmentalism’s predation against 
developmentalism, some members argued that environmental goods and services 
need to be undertaken in other WTO bodies, such as the Negotiating Group 
on Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products and the Council for Trade in 
Services Special Session. The ongoing negotiations take a two-track approach, 
in which both list-driven specific examples and criterion-driven conceptual 
definitions are discussed.
It should be noted that mutualism in this area was suggested mainly by the 
members with industrial competitiveness in the designated goods and services. 
This was directly reflected in the definitional problem of what “environmental 
goods and services” are. For instance, the US, Canada, and New Zealand 
suggested starting discussion on the basis of the definitions and the lists of 
environmental goods made by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
or the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), to 
which they belonged. While the US proposed the end-use criterion, the EC, 
which was not a member of APEC, was eager to consider the process and 
production methods (PPMs) criterion in identifying environmental goods and 
services. A number of members opposed the PPMs criterion, because it could 
conflict with the “like products” definition in the national treatment principle 
of the WTO. Qatar and other members of the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) cautioned against both PPMs and end-use criteria, 
because energy, such as natural gas, had to do with processes of production and 
the end-use criterion may also imply the life-cycle approach.(42) Qatar argued that 
relative economic and environmental merits could also be used as the criterion.(43)
I now turn to the definitional issue, with a possible list based on the criterion 
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originally developed at CTESS and/or other WTO bodies. The US proposed 
a framework with a core (with consensus) and a complementary (without 
consensus) list of environmental goods, which would allow some flexibility.(44) 
The EC argued that the two-list approach would not lead to environmental 
benefits, and that flexibility could be achieved in other ways, for instance 
different levels of commitment and timeframes.(45) Developing countries, such as 
Malaysia and Kenya, viewed neither the APEC nor the OECD lists appropriate 
as the basis for negotiation. Brazil argued that the US had only included high 
value-added products, in which they had a competitive advantage, on its core 
list. In addressing export interests of developing countries, they would favor 
UNCTAD’s approach to environmental goods.(46) China indicated the possibility 
of developing a “common” list and a “development” list.(47) Other developing 
countries suggested the need to reflect agriculture and forestry interests in 
developing countries, as well as the need for capacity building and technology 
transfer, and special and differentiated treatment for developing countries.(48)
VI. Conclusion: Prospects for Hong Kong and Beyond
The negotiation impasse in the Doha negotiations on the WTO–MEA 
relationship arose out of a rift between the conceptual and practical approaches 
to “mutually supportive” relationships between the international trade and 
environmental regimes. It should be noted that a Win-Win solution to the 
relationship between WTO liberalism and MEA environmentalism may result 
in a losing battle for developmental and social concerns. Toward a sustainable 
mutual supportiveness, a Win-Win-Win-Win solution to the four norms must 
be searched for from a wider perspective. Drawn from the analysis above, 
prospects for Hong Kong and possible negotiation results influencing the future 
WTO–MEA relationship are summarized in Table 2. Actual negotiation results 
may be influenced by a range of factors, including the role to be played by the 
newly appointed WTO Director-General, Pascal Lamy, and may differ from the 
forecasts presented here.
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Table 2: Possible Negotiation Results of the WTO–MEA Relationship
  UNCTAD WTO MEAs/UNEP ILO/WHO
  Development Liberalism/Econ. Environmental Social
 Paragraph 31 (i) 0/– 0 0 0/–
 Paragraph 31 (ii) +/0 + +/0/– 0
 Paragraph 31 (iii) +/0 ++ +/0 0
First, as for Paragraph (i) of the WTO rules and specific trade obligations 
in MEAs, the principles of deference and no-hierarchy would maintain and 
reproduce neutralism between the WTO and MEAs, although the CTESS 
mandate only focuses on the smaller component of MEAs. The same situation 
could apply to the relationship between the WTO and other international 
organizations, like UNCTAD and ILO. Another possibility is that WTO–MEA 
neutralism would be maintained at the cost of social and development concerns.
Second,  as  for  information exchange and observer s tatus,  the 
institutionalization of the status quo without reciprocity would not benefit 
MEAs at all. While acknowledging that cooperation with other international 
organizations contributes to better global governance, the Report submitted by 
the Consultative Board to Director-General Supachai suggests that observer 
status be granted “solely on the basis of potential contribution to the WTO’s 
role as a forum for trade negotiations.”(49) It will be commensalism in favor of 
the WTO. Alternatively, MEAs can be the parasites. The parasitizing by a small 
number of MEAs at the CTESS on only an ad hoc basis is not expected to open 
up a route toward mutualism. However, the granting of observer status is likely 
to be treated as a horizontal issue, and therefore it could improve not only MEAs 
but also development organizations and social welfare organizations, if their 
requests are to be approved at the same time in the WTO.
Third, the outcome for environmental goods and services depends on what 
kind of list is to be agreed on. A WTO list would to a greater extent benefit 
liberalization of environmental goods and services, which could provide 
asymmetrical gains for MEAs/UNEP, which may or may not lead to positive 
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gains. The UNCTAD approach may also be integrated in the negotiation result; 
however, the UNCTAD definition of environmental goods and services may 
not be compatible with the preferences of MEAs/UNEP and the environmental 
community. For all three negotiation areas, the social dimension, as represented 
by ILO and WHO, is underrepresented.
As compared to quick, efficient legalization by a dispute settlement system, 
the rule-making function of the WTO is slow. As compared to the modality 
negotiations on market access, the negotiations on non-trade concerns, including 
trade and environment, are deadlocked or postponed to future negotiations. 
While the dispute settlement mechanism and the formula and modalities could 
proceed efficiently, there are limitations to these mechanical solutions. While 
conflicts in power and interests may be settled within a limited time, conflicts 
between norms and values would remain unresolved. Despite slow progress, 
there will be many opportunities for effective solutions to value-laden conflict 
through rule-making negotiations.
Theoretically, the realist concepts of “power,” “conflict,” “balance,” 
“frictions,” and “interface,” all of which are borrowed from physics, are less 
useful in accounting for the Doha round negotiations on the WTO–MEA 
relationship.(50) Methodological individualism, on which liberal institutionalism 
relies, is based on an atom-like individual and a molecule-like group. Marxist 
dialectics looks like a chemical response or a mathematical integration. The 
concepts of “co-evolution” and “symbiosis,” which the present paper has 
suggested, are more useful than the existing explanations in detailing the WTO–
MEA relationship, when these biological concepts are used in combination with 
norms that social constructivism emphasizes to account for human behavior. 
This is because objectivity in natural sciences undermines the subjectivity 
or inter-subjectivity on which constructivism is based. Urs P. Thomas called 
for “ecolomics” analyzing the complex interactions between ecology and 
economics.(51) In a similar manner, ecolopolitics is also needed.
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にヒエラルキー関係を作らず相互尊重せよとの立場と、アメリカの実践的アプローチ
のように、WTOにおけるMEAsの関与を限定化する立場が対立している。前者の結
末は双利共生というよりも、せいぜい中立関係であろう。WTO交渉での妥協が片害
関係を生みだすおそれもある。
第二に、情報交換とオブザーバー資格の供与問題は、貿易と環境が捕食被食関係に
あるとの批判を払拭するために設定された。とりわけ、WTOにはMEAs会合のオブ
ザーバー資格が供与されているのに、MEAsにはWTO会合の定期的オブザーバー資
格が供与されていない。この問題は他の国際機関との関係にも関わるので、貿易交渉
委員会や一般理事会の議題とされうる。自由主義を損なわない範囲でMEAsに対する
オブザーバー資格が認められる場合には、MEAsがWTO機関に寄生することになり
かねない。UNCTADや ILOなどの国際機関にも同様にオブザーバー資格が与えられ
ると、より広範な視点から相利関係を形成する前提に近づく。
第三に、環境関連物品・サービスの自由化問題については、相利関係が前提にある。
しかし、国際産業競争力を持つ国はより大きな相対的利得を得ることが見込まれる。
そのため環境関連物品・サービスの定義をめぐって、先進国と途上国の対立、地域間
対立、途上国間対立が見られる。交渉結果によっては、非対称的な相利共生をはじめ、
さまざまな帰結がありうる。
